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INTRODUCTION 
It is commonplace, in today’s world, for pregnant women to work 
until very close to their due date, and many don’t need any changes on 
the job. But sometimes women may request accommodations — such 
as being able to sit on a stool or avoid heavy lifting — to permit them 
to work safely and productively through a pregnancy. Legal claims in 
this area have skyrocketed in recent years.1 In 2013, I published an 
 
 * Copyright © 2017 Deborah A. Widiss. Professor of Law, Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law. Many thanks to Cynthia Calvert for helpful suggestions on an 
earlier draft; this essay also benefited from conversations with Joanna Grossman, 
Emily Martin, and Liz Morris. I am grateful to Dean Austen Parrish and the Maurer 
School of Law Summer Research Stipend Program for supporting this project. My 
thanks as well to the editors of the UC Davis Law Review for their extremely 
conscientious work. 
 1 See CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT, CAREGIVERS IN THE WORKPLACE: FAMILY 
RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION UPDATE 2016, at 15 (2016), 
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article, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, in this journal that 
explored this topic in depth.2 I argued that lower courts were 
misinterpreting the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) — which 
mandates that pregnant employees be treated “the same” as other 
employees “similar in their ability or inability to work”3 — by 
permitting employers to treat pregnant employees less favorably than 
employees with other kinds of health conditions, so long as the 
employer could point to a “pregnancy-blind” basis for the distinction. 
My concern was spurred by the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), which greatly expanded the 
range of health conditions that could qualify as disabilities under the 
ADA.4 As I explained in Gilbert Redux, the erroneous interpretation 
endorsed by some courts that ADA-accommodated employees could 
not be used as comparators under the PDA meant that the enhanced 
support for individuals with disabilities would have the perverse effect 
of decreasing employers’ obligations to pregnant employees.5 
The legal landscape has changed dramatically in the four years since 
I published Gilbert Redux. Most centrally, the Supreme Court issued a 
major decision, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), interpreting 
the PDA’s “same treatment” language as it applies to requests for 
accommodations.6 Additionally, new regulations from the Department 
of Labor and new guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”) each discuss the issue;7 a growing number of 
courts have considered how the amended ADA applies to pregnancy-
related conditions;8 and many states have enacted new laws that 
explicitly require reasonable accommodations for pregnancy.9 This 
 
http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRDupdate2016.pdf (reporting 315% increase in 
pregnancy accommodation claims in 2006–2015, as compared to the previous 
decade).  
 2 Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux: The Interaction of the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 46 UC DAVIS L. 
REV. 961 (2013) [hereinafter Gilbert Redux]. 
 3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
 4 See Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 
122 Stat. 3553 (2008). 
 5 Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 1023-25. 
 6 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).  
 7 See 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.5 (2016); U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (EEOC), 
ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 915.003: PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED ISSUES 
(2015), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm.  
 8 See infra Part IV. 
 9 See infra Part IV. 
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essay explores the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Young and these other developments for the PDA–ADA interaction I 
analyzed in Gilbert Redux.10 
Young makes clear that lower courts erred in holding that employees 
accommodated pursuant to “pregnancy blind” policies could not be 
used as comparators in analysis under the PDA.11 Young requires that 
lower courts probe any such justifications to determine whether the 
employer’s refusal to accommodate the pregnant employee was 
infected by discriminatory bias.12 Such scrutiny is required even if an 
employer asserts (as UPS did) that its justification for differential 
treatment was compliance with a different statutory mandate, such as 
the ADA or a workers’ compensation law. (Justice Alito, concurring in 
the judgment, suggests otherwise, but in this respect his interpretation 
differs from that of the majority and thus should not be followed by 
lower courts.)13 Crucially, the Court specifies that evidence that the 
employer routinely accommodates other health conditions but refuses 
to provide support for pregnancy is itself strong circumstantial 
evidence of discrimination.14 Thus, in many cases, if a pregnant 
employee denied an accommodation can show that, under the 
employer’s policies, other employees receive support for limitations 
like those she experienced, summary judgment should be 
inappropriate. 
However, the Court stopped short of endorsing the interpretation 
advocated by Peggy Young and the United States as amicus curiae (and 
also the interpretation I had advocated in Gilbert Redux) that intent 
 
 10 Other post-Young commentary that addresses similar issues includes: Joanna L. 
Grossman, Expanding the Core: Pregnancy Discrimination Law as It Approaches Full 
Term, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 825, 849-60 (2016) (concluding that Young helpfully resolved 
clear misinterpretations of the PDA but also highlighting the limitations of the PDA’s 
comparative approach); Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 995, 1066-101 (2015) (historical review of accommodation law up to and 
including Young that emphasizes the potential disadvantages for women in advocating 
for pregnancy-specific supports); Eliza H. Simon, Parity by Comparison: The Case for 
Comparing Pregnant and Disabled Workers, 30 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 254, 284-93 
(2015) (using intersectionality and disruption theory to support claim that ADA-
accommodated employees can be used as comparators in PDA analysis); Lynn 
Ridgeway Zehrt, A Special Delivery: Litigating Pregnancy Accommodation Claims After 
the Supreme Court’s Decision in Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 68 RUTGERS U. L. 
REV. 683, 706-16 (2016) (arguing the standard in Young is ambiguous and does not 
fully repudiate pre-Young limitations in the case law).  
 11 See infra Part II. 
 12 See Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1353-56 (2015).  
 13 See id. at 1356-61; see also infra Part II.B.  
 14 See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354-55.  
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was irrelevant, so long as a plaintiff could show other workers received 
more favorable treatment. Justice Breyer, writing for the majority, 
expressed the concern that this interpretation would “grant[] pregnant 
workers a ‘most-favored-nation’ status,” whereby an employer’s 
decision to provide support for a few exceptional employees would 
require that pregnant employees receive the same support, and 
pregnant employees would accordingly be treated much better than 
workers with other kinds of health conditions.15 Justice Alito’s 
concurring and Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinions expressed the same 
concern.16 
Because the facts in Young arose prior to the effective date of the 
ADAAA, the Court had no cause to consider how the ADAAA affected 
its analysis.17 The significant changes that statute made to disability 
law means that the “most-favored-nation” concern that so engaged 
many of the Justices in Young is (now) largely a strawman. Under the 
ADAAA and its implementing regulations, an impairment that 
substantially limits an individual’s ability to lift, bend, walk, stand, or 
engage in other major life activities — even on a temporary basis — is 
a covered disability that must be reasonably accommodated by an 
employer, unless doing so would impose an undue hardship on the 
employer.18 Thus, the question going forward is not whether pregnant 
employees will be treated better than employees with other health 
conditions, but rather whether they will routinely be treated less well 
than other employees. Compliance with the ADA or other statutes 
may explain why some other employees receive certain 
accommodations; the question in a PDA case, however, is why, when 
such accommodations are obviously feasible, does an employer refuse 
 
 15 See id. at 1349-50.  
 16 See id. at 1358 & n.3 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1363 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 17 See id. at 1348 (explicitly declining to discuss the significance of the ADAAA).  
 18 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) & (j) (2016); 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1630 app. (2016). Although the statute does not state explicitly that temporary 
conditions are covered, the EEOC’s regulations take the position that this is the 
reasonable interpretation of the statutory language, and that duration is simply a 
factor to be considered in assessing whether the impairment “substantially limits” an 
individual’s ability to engage in a major life activity. There is some disagreement 
among courts as to whether to defer to the EEOC’s interpretation. Compare, e.g., 
Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 331-33 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding 
temporary disabilities may be covered and that the EEOC’s regulations merit Chevron 
deference), and Heatherly v. Portillo’s Hot Dogs, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 2d 913, 920-21 
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (holding temporary restriction on lifting due to a high risk pregnancy 
could be covered), with Mastrio v. Eurest Servs., Inc., No. 3:13–cv–00564, 2014 WL 
840229, at *3-6 (D. Conn. Mar. 4, 2014) (holding temporary conditions are generally 
not covered).  
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to provide the same level of support to pregnant employees. The 
Supreme Court has specified that an employer cannot deny support to 
pregnant employees simply because it would entail extra costs or 
administrative burdens.19 Courts, and ultimately juries, must carefully 
scrutinize the rationales for any such differential treatment to assess 
whether they are based on discriminatory attitudes towards 
pregnancy, such as stereotypes that pregnant women are less capable 
or less committed to work than other employees. 
This essay proceeds as follows. Part I briefly discusses the historical 
context for the PDA and the structure of its statutory mandate. Part II 
analyzes the majority and concurring opinion in Young in detail. Part 
III looks at how lower courts have begun applying Young, with 
particular attention to a Second Circuit decision that offers the fullest 
discussion (to date) of how courts should assess claims that 
accommodations for non-pregnant employees were provided to 
comply with distinct statutory mandates. Part IV briefly summarizes 
other recent legal developments that may also require employers to 
provide accommodations for pregnant employees. I conclude by 
suggesting that Congress should clarify employers’ duties — and 
ensure more uniform support for pregnant workers — by enacting the 
proposed Pregnant Workers Fairness Act.20 
I. THE PDA’S “SAME TREATMENT” CLAUSE 
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) was enacted in 1978 to 
supersede the Court’s decision in Gilbert v. General Electric Co., which 
had held that GE’s exclusion of pregnancy from an otherwise 
comprehensive temporary disability policy did not violate Title VII’s 
prohibition on discrimination on the basis of “sex.”21 The PDA 
amends the definition of “because of sex” that is operative in Title VII. 
It contains two clauses. The first makes explicit that discrimination 
because of “pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions” is a 
form of sex discrimination.22 The second clause provides that “women 
affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall 
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including 
 
 19 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.  
 20 See H.R. 2654, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1512, 114th Cong. (2015). This bill will 
likely be reintroduced in the 115th Congress, which convened in January 2017. 
 21 See 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).  
 22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
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receipt of benefits under fringe benefits programs, as other persons not 
so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.”23 
Gilbert Redux discusses the PDA’s application to pregnancy 
accommodation claims in detail. I argued that many lower courts had 
erred in holding that polices that were “pregnancy blind” — such as 
limiting light duty positions to employees with workplace injuries or 
compliance with the ADA — were always permissible.24 I suggested 
that the more natural reading of the PDA’s “same treatment” clause 
was that pregnant employees needed to receive the same level of 
support from their employers that employees with comparable 
limitations caused by other health conditions received, and that it was 
immaterial that such accommodations were sometimes a response to 
workers’ compensation laws or the ADA.25 
I bolstered this plain text argument with a review of the historical 
context for the PDA. The PDA came on the heels of a dramatic growth 
in employer support for other kinds of health conditions; much of this 
was spurred by statutory law, like state statutes mandating workers 
compensation (which in turn encouraged employers to create light 
duty positions) or short-term disability benefits. Review of the 
Congressional record makes clear that the PDA was intended to 
ensure that comparable benefits were extended to pregnant 
employees.26 I argued that the PDA’s same treatment language should 
be interpreted to ensure that pregnant employees, similarly, benefit 
from the expansion of support for other health conditions that arose 
from the 2008 amendments to the ADA. 
II. YOUNG V. UPS 
In Young, UPS-driver Peggy Young challenged her employer’s refusal 
to permit her to transfer to a light duty position during her pregnancy. 
UPS routinely provided light duty options for employees who were 
injured on the job, employees who had ADA-qualifying disabilities 
(applying the pre-ADAAA standard), and employees who lost their 
Department of Transportation licenses. Peggy Young argued UPS should 
likewise accommodate her pregnancy.27 The district court and the 
Fourth Circuit granted summary judgment in favor of UPS, reasoning 
that these other policies were “pregnancy blind” and accordingly that 
 
 23 Id.  
 24 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 1018-25.  
 25 See id. at 1025-35. 
 26 See id. at 989-98, 1025-35.  
 27 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1347 (2015).  
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UPS’s denial of Peggy Young’s request did not violate the PDA.28 The 
Court vacated and remanded.29 Justice Breyer authored the decision for 
a five-justice majority of the Court, with Justice Alito concurring in the 
judgment, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas dissenting. This 
Part explains the Court’s interpretation of the “same treatment” 
language and then addresses a question not before the Court: How does 
it affect the interaction of the PDA and the amended ADA? 
A. Modified McDonnell Douglas Test 
In its briefs to the Supreme Court, UPS argued that the Fourth 
Circuit had properly applied Title VII, and that, so long as the denial 
of accommodations was pursuant to a neutral policy, it was 
permissible.30 The Supreme Court flatly rejected UPS’s approach as 
untenable. The Court explained that this interpretation would suggest 
that GE’s disability plan would pass muster — and there was no doubt 
that the PDA was enacted to supersede the decision in Gilbert and 
make clear that such exclusions were unlawful.31 
Peggy Young, and the United States as amicus curiae, argued, by 
contrast, that the analysis should simply turn on whether the 
employer had provided accommodations for non-pregnant employees 
with similar limitations; they contended that, if so, pregnant 
employees must receive the same kind of supports.32 Young’s position 
was consistent with that espoused by the EEOC in guidance issued 
shortly after the Court granted certiorari in the case.33 It was also 
largely consistent with the approach I proposed in Gilbert Redux.34 
 
 28 See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 707 F.3d 437, 449-51 (4th Cir. 2013); 
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08–2586, 2011 WL 665321, at *12-14 (D. 
Md. Feb. 14, 2011).  
 29 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1356. 
 30 See Brief for Respondent at 28-29, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 
WL 5512140. 
 31 See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1353.  
 32 See Petitioner’s Brief at 20-21, Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 
4441528; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15-16, 
Young, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226), 2014 WL 4536939. 
 33 See EEOC Pregnancy Guidance, Pt. I.A.5, Pt. I.C. (July 14, 2014); see also 
Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 1018-20 (discussing the EEOC’s earlier 
statements reaching similar conclusions). The EEOC has since revised its guidance to 
conform with the interpretation of the PDA set forth in Young.  
 34 See generally Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 1025-35. Indeed, both the 
petitioner and the United States cited analysis from my article in support of the 
interpretation they put forward. See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 32, at 42 n.16; Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 32, at 23-24. 
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The Court rejected this interpretation as well. It expressed concern 
that this would grant pregnant employees “‘most-favored-nation’ 
status,” where an employer’s decision to provide a few workers with 
accommodations — for example, employees who worked in 
particularly hazardous jobs or held particularly crucial positions in the 
workplace — would create a requirement to provide comparable 
accommodations to all pregnant employees, but not for other non-
pregnant employees.35 The Court believed this result was not intended 
by Congress.36 Further, as a textual matter, the Court contended it was 
ambiguous how the statutory mandate to treat pregnant employees 
“the same as other employees . . . similar in their ability or inability to 
work” should apply in a situation in which an employer 
accommodated some employees with health conditions that caused 
limitations similar to those caused by pregnancy, but also did not 
accommodate some other employees with health conditions that 
caused limitations similar to those caused by pregnancy.37 In that 
context, to which employees should the pregnant employees be 
compared? 
The answer, the Court suggested, turned on whether the employee 
could show that the denial of accommodations to pregnant employees 
was motivated by discriminatory intent. Importantly, however, it 
modified the McDonnell Douglas proof framework typically applied to 
intentional discrimination claims to incorporate the “same treatment” 
language mandate. To make out the prima facie case, a pregnant 
employee needs to show that she belonged to the protected class (i.e., 
that she was pregnant); that she sought accommodations; that the 
employer did not accommodate her; and that the employer did 
accommodate other employees who were “similar in their ability or 
inability to work.”38 If a plaintiff makes this showing, the employer is 
required to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory” rationale for 
the difference in treatment.39 The plaintiff may then, as in any other 
 
 35 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1349-50.  
 36 See id. at 1350.  
 37 See id. at 1351. As a factual matter, it was unclear how many, if any, employees 
at UPS fell into the category of non-pregnant employees who were denied 
accommodations. See id. at 1347 (summarizing evidence showing non-work injuries 
were sometimes accommodated and quoting the deposition of a UPS shop steward 
who asserted that the only time light duty requests were an issue was “‘with women 
who were pregnant’”).  
 38 Id. at 1354 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).  
 39 Id.  
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disparate treatment case, present evidence that suggests that the 
employer’s proffered reasons are not credible.40 
In articulating this standard, the Court highlighted several points. 
First, the Court emphasized that making out a prima facie case under 
the McDonnell Douglas framework is not intended to be an “onerous” 
burden, and that it does not require a plaintiff “to show that those 
whom the employer favored and those whom the employer disfavored 
were similar in all but the protected ways.”41 These observations about 
the flexibility of the McDonnell Douglas test are applicable to any 
disparate treatment case. The Court then applied this general concept to 
pregnancy accommodations under the PDA. It specified that the 
comparative aspect of this first step could be satisfied simply by 
showing that some other employees received accommodations for 
limitations like those experienced by the pregnant employee, regardless 
of what rationale an employer might offer for having providing such 
support. This functionally overruled circuit precedent that had held that 
employees provided light duty after a workplace injury could not be 
used as comparators in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.42 
Second, the Court stated flatly that an employer’s legitimate non-
discriminatory rationale “normally cannot consist simply of a claim 
that it is more expensive or less convenient to add pregnant women to 
the category of those . . . whom the employer accommodates.”43 This 
 
 40 In Young, the Court suggests that the plaintiff would need to establish that the 
employer’s proffered rationale was “pretextual.” See id. However, since the Court 
frames the issue as a variant of a standard disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff should 
be able to establish liability by demonstrating simply that her pregnancy was a 
“motivating factor” in a decision to deny her an accommodation, even if it was not the 
only factor that affected the decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012). A showing 
by the employer that it would have taken the same action even if it had not considered 
her pregnancy could, however, limit the remedies that would be available. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).  
 41 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. These statements are supported to citations to non-
PDA Title VII cases and thus emphasize that the prima facie case should be a flexible 
standard in any Title VII case. However, it is also important to emphasize that 
discrimination can occur without a comparator present. See generally Suzanne B. 
Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011).  
 42 Professor Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt argues that it is not clear whether Young 
resolved the pre-existing circuit split as to whether employees with workplace injuries 
could be used in the prima facie case. See Zehrt, supra note 10, at 706-07. I disagree. 
As explained in the text, and infra at text accompanying notes 70-71, I think that the 
Court’s application of its standard to the facts in Young makes clear employees 
accommodated after a workplace injury may be comparators for the prima facie case. 
See also Grossman, supra note 10, at 853-55 (also contending Young superseded prior 
circuit case law holding otherwise). 
 43 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.  
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interpretation of the PDA was appropriate, the Court explained, 
because the PDA was enacted to “overturn ‘both the holding and the 
reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision.’”44 The Court observed, 
correctly, that the employer in Gilbert could have argued45 — and in 
fact, did argue46 — that its refusal to provide temporary disability 
benefits to pregnant employees stemmed from a desire to reduce its 
costs. The PDA was enacted to supersede Gilbert and to make clear 
that such exclusions were a form of sex discrimination.47 Indeed, it 
was well recognized at the time that the PDA was enacted that it 
would increase the costs that employers bore.48 
Further, the Court specified that a plaintiff can reach a jury by 
providing evidence that “the employer’s policies impose a significant 
burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s ‘legitimate non-
discriminatory’ reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify that 
burden, but rather — when considered along with the burden 
imposed — give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.”49 A 
showing that the employer “accommodates a large percentage of 
nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage 
of pregnant workers” is one way (but, as discussed below, not the only 
way)50 to create a genuine issue of material fact, and thus preclude a 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, even if the 
defendant can point to a plausible legitimate non-discriminatory 
rationale for the distinction.51 
Writing in dissent, Justice Scalia roundly criticized the majority’s 
reasoning on this point, alleging that it improperly mixed the 
standards employed in disparate impact cases and disparate treatment 
 
 44 Id. at 1353 (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 
462 U.S. 669, 678 (1983)).  
 45 Id. at 1354. 
 46 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 992 n. 138 (discussing GE’s 
arguments concerning increased costs in covering pregnancy). 
 47 In Gilbert Redux, I focused on the same point and argued that this suggested 
that intent should be irrelevant in deciding a claim brought under the “same 
treatment” clause. See id. at 1026-28. I continue to believe that the interpretation I 
advocated in Gilbert Redux is more consistent with the text and history of the PDA, 
and that it would be easier to apply than the interpretation adopted in Young. 
However, as a practical matter, proper application of the Young test will often result in 
the same outcome, at least in so far as whether a plaintiff may survive a motion to 
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. See infra Part II.B. 
 48 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 996-97. 
 49 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.  
 50 See infra text accompanying notes 103–06.  
 51 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. 
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cases.52 While somewhat unusual, the Court’s approach makes good 
practical sense. Pregnant women have long been discounted and 
disparaged as marginal workers.53 Even though the PDA was enacted 
more than thirty years ago, such biases remain prevalent. Pregnancy 
discrimination claims are routinely filed with the EEOC,54 and there is 
extensive research documenting the pervasiveness of conscious and 
unconscious stereotypes about pregnant women’s lack of capacity and 
commitment to work.55 When an employer, such as UPS, regularly 
accommodates many workers with health conditions that impact their 
ability to work, but refuses to accommodate pregnant workers, it is 
appropriate to probe carefully the basis of that decision. The fact that 
an employer may be able to articulate a plausible pregnancy-neutral 
justification for the distinction does not discount the likelihood that 
its lack of support for pregnant workers is infected by bias. As the 
Court put it, “[w]hy, when the employer accommodated so many, 
could it not accommodate pregnant women as well?”56 
B. Interaction of the PDA and the ADA after Young 
The facts in Young arose before the effective date of the ADAAA. 
Accordingly, the Court had no call to address explicitly the particular 
question that animated my analysis in Gilbert Redux: How the 
significant expansion in the scope of disabilities covered under the 
amended ADA would affect claims brought by pregnant employees 
seeking accommodations? 
 
 52 See id. at 1365-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 53 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 972-73, 988-89, 995 (reviewing 
history of discrimination and bias against pregnant workers); see also Grossman, supra 
note 10, at 857 (making a similar argument as to why the Court’s approach in Young is 
warranted).  
 54 See Pregnancy Discrimination Charges FY 2010 – FY 2015, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy_ 
new.cfm, (last visited Dec. 21, 2016); see also Fact Sheet on Recent Pregnancy-Discrimination 
Litigation, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/ 
pregnancy_fact_sheet_litigation.cfm (last visited Dec. 21, 2016) (identifying significant 
court victories and settlements in cases brought by the EEOC).  
 55 See, e.g., Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1368-72 (2008) (collecting and discussing studies showing bias 
against pregnant employees); Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals Become 
Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701 (2004) (demonstrating 
pregnant women are rated as less competent than other employees); Jennifer 
Cunningham & Therese Macan, Effects of Applicant Pregnancy on Hiring Decisions and 
Interview Ratings, 57 SEX ROLES 497, 504-06 (2007) (showing pregnancy makes it less 
likely that applicants will be hired for jobs). 
 56 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1355.  
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As far as potential coverage under the ADA directly, the Court 
simply mentioned that the changes made to the ADA might make 
claims under the Court’s interpretation of the PDA in Young less 
important, in that the amended act clarifies that impairments that 
substantially limit an individual’s ability to lift, stand, or bend are 
ADA-covered disabilities.57 The Court than referenced the EEOC’s 
regulations implementing the amendments, which specify that 
employers are required to accommodate employees with “temporary 
lifting restrictions [that] originate off the job.”58 The EEOC and 
commentators have taken the position that these changes to the ADA 
mean that many conditions associated with pregnancy, childbirth, and 
lactation can be qualifying disabilities,59 and courts are beginning to 
agree.60 Thus, many pregnant employees should receive 
accommodations pursuant to the amended ADA. 
However, the EEOC has re-affirmed, in regulations issued after the 
ADAAA, that it does not consider pregnancy itself to be an ADA-
qualifying disability because it is not an impairment.61 There will 
likely be some pregnant employees who could legitimately benefit 
from an accommodation but who will not be able to show that they 
have an ADA-qualifying disability, even if that standard is construed 
broadly.62 In these cases, the question of how courts should assess a 
claim that other employees were accommodated pursuant to an 
ostensibly “pregnancy blind” policy, such as compliance with the ADA 
or providing light duty positions only for workplace injuries,63 
remains crucial. 
 
 57 See id. at 1348.  
 58 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. §1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (2016)).  
 59 See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 915.003, supra note 7 (“[U]nder the 
amended ADA, it is likely that a number of pregnancy-related impairments that 
impose work-related restrictions will be substantially limiting, even though they are 
only temporary.”). See generally Joan C. Williams et al., A Sip of Cool Water: Pregnancy 
Accommodation After the ADA Amendments Act, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 97, 114-19 
(2013).  
 60 See infra text accompanying notes 133–34. 
 61 See 29 C.F.R. pt 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (2016). 
 62 At a minimum, this likely includes pregnant women seeking transfers away 
from potentially hazardous exposure, without any showing of any kind of pregnancy 
complication. See Williams et al., supra note 59, at 136. More generally, courts may 
remain resistant to categorizing relatively commonplace effects of pregnancy, such as 
morning sickness or back pain, as disabilities, even under the amended ADA. But see 
id. at 137-38, 142-48 (demonstrating many of these kind of impairments are properly 
encompassed within the ADA’s expanded understanding of disability).  
 63 Vicki Schultz argues that a policy of limiting light duty positions to workplace 
injuries should be considered “facially discriminatory” in that it “excluded virtually all 
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The majority opinion and Justice Alito’s concurrence take different 
positions as to the proper analysis in such situations. It is important to 
highlight these distinctions and emphasize that lower courts (of 
course) must follow the majority’s approach, rather than Justice 
Alito’s. Justice Alito’s concurrence deals with the question more 
directly, but I believe that the glosses on the PDA’s language that he 
suggests unreasonably narrow the plain language of the statute and 
undermine its purpose. First, he proposes that pregnant women can 
only be compared to employees whose jobs involve the “performance 
of same or very similar tasks.”64 This construction is clearly in tension 
with the majority’s repeated emphasis that making out a prima facie 
case is not intended to be “onerous”; indeed, as explained above, the 
majority explicitly rejects the contention that a plaintiff would need to 
be “similar in all but the protected ways.”65 
Second, Justice Alito proposes that the language be interpreted to 
mean “similar in relation to the ability or inability to work,” and he 
specifies that groups would “not [be] similar in the relevant sense if 
the employer has a neutral business reason for treating them 
differently.”66 In applying the test that he has crafted to the facts in 
Young, Justice Alito simply states, without any explanation, that is 
“obvious” that compliance with the ADA, and providing light duty 
positions to employees who are injured on the job, are acceptable 
“neutral” reasons for providing accommodations to some employees 
but declining to provide them to pregnant employees.67 (This is not 
“obvious” at all; rather, as discussed below, it is clearly contradicted 
 
pregnant workers, without ever mentioning pregnancy, by using rules that served as 
definitional proxies.” Schultz, supra note 10, at 1089. This is a creative argument, but 
it is probably unlikely to gain traction in the lower courts since the Young Court 
implicitly rejected it.  
 64 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1357-58 (2015) (Alito, J., 
concurring). Justice Alito suggests that this interpretation is appropriate because 
otherwise an employer that provided paid leave to employees with injuries in jobs that 
require heavy lifting might also have to provide paid leave to a pregnant employee in a 
desk job, even though her job did not require heavy lifting. See id. This concern is 
specious. In that instance, the pregnant employee is not “similar in her ability or 
inability to work” to the employees in the jobs that require lifting, even if they have 
similar lifting restrictions. That is because the employees in the jobs that require heavy 
lifting are not able to work, while the pregnant employee is fully able to work because 
her job does not require lifting. Thus, she would not have a claim for the 
accommodation. 
 65 Id. at 1353-54 (majority opinion).  
 66 Id. at 1359 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 67 See id. at 1360.  
  
1436 University of California, Davis [Vol. 50:1423 
by the historical record for the PDA.68) In contrast to the majority 
opinion, Justice Alito suggests that courts would not need to probe the 
veracity of such “neutral” reasons. Rather, he focuses the pretext 
analysis solely on the question of whether UPS could adequately 
justify its decision to provide accommodations to drivers who lost 
their DOT certifications, while denying comparable accommodations 
to pregnant employees, apparently because he does not deem this 
distinction to be a comparably “neutral” justification.69 
But the majority rejects Justice Alito’s interpretation of how the 
analysis should proceed. Following the plain language of the statute, 
the majority states that at the prima facie stage, the only question is 
whether employees who received accommodations are “similar in their 
ability and inability to work.”70 This includes employees who receive 
accommodations pursuant to the ADA or to light duty policies for on-
the-job injuries. This is made clear by the Court’s application of the 
standard to the facts in Young itself, where it referenced UPS’s “three 
separate accommodation policies (on-the-job, ADA, DOT)” and stated 
that on remand the Fourth Circuit would need to assess the 
“combined effects of these policies” and whether “UPS’ reasons for 
having treated Young less favorably than it treated these other non-
pregnant employees were pretextual.”71 In other words, there is no 
question that the majority in Young considered employees 
accommodated pursuant to all three of these policies as potential 
comparators to Peggy Young herself. 
The majority opinion does not speak to whether compliance with a 
statutory mandate could be claimed as a legitimate non-discriminatory 
rationale (as discussed below, it is difficult to separate such claims 
conceptually from concern over costs, which is disallowed).72 But even 
assuming it could be, the majority’s test states that, after an employer 
puts forward a legitimate non-discriminatory reason, a plaintiff has an 
 
 68 See infra text accompanying notes 80–81; see also Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra 
note 2, at 997. 
 69 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1360 (Alito, J., concurring). In this respect, Justice Alito 
differed from the Fourth Circuit, which had held the DOT policy was also a “neutral, 
pregnancy-blind” policy. Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 784 F.3d 192, 205 (4th 
Cir. 2013). This disagreement highlights the uncertainty of the line that Justice Alito 
suggests courts should be able to discern between legitimate “neutral” rationales and 
non-legitimate “neutral” rationales, since the distinction apparently does not turn 
solely on whether or not the policy references pregnancy (in that the DOT policy also 
did not reference pregnancy).  
 70 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.  
 71 Id. at 1355-56.  
 72 See infra text accompanying notes 121–24.  
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opportunity to show it is pretextual and that this may be done by 
showing that the “employer’s policies impose a significant burden” on 
pregnant workers that is not adequately justified by the employer’s 
legitimate non-discriminatory reason.73 A plaintiff can create a 
“genuine issue of material fact as to whether a significant burden 
exists by providing evidence that the employer accommodates a large 
percentage of nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a 
large percentage of pregnant workers.”74 In other words, a factfinder 
must have the opportunity to probe whether the statutory 
requirements are the real reasons for the solicitude the employer has 
shown to non-pregnant workers and, even if they are the real 
justifications, why, having made such accommodations for others, the 
employer refuses to provide comparable support for pregnant 
employees. Thus, in most instances, even if an employer can point to 
compliance with a statutory mandate as a justification for treating 
pregnant employees differently from other employees, summary judgment 
will not be appropriate. 
The majority’s approach differs somewhat from the analytical 
framework I proposed in Gilbert Redux, but it shares certain strengths. 
Importantly, it incorporates truly legitimate — i.e., truly pregnancy-
neutral — cost considerations into the analysis but separates them from 
the bias that so often affects decisions regarding pregnant employees.75 
That is, the ADA already incorporates a cost-based analysis: 
accommodations are only required if they are reasonable and they do 
not impose an undue hardship on an employer.76 Light duty positions 
for workers with on-the-job injuries are typically provided because they 
reduce employer costs under workers’ compensation statutes.77 
Employers who provide accommodations in a more ad hoc manner 
likewise do so based on a cost-benefit analysis that the modification is 
worthwhile (even if that “pay off” is intangible, such as the goodwill and 
loyalty that it instills in employees). In all of these contexts, some 
accommodations will be deemed too expensive. For example, under the 
ADA, an employer generally is not required to create a new position to 
 
 73 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1354. 
 74 Id. at 1354.  
 75 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 1028 (discussing this aspect of the 
PDA’s comparative mandate).  
 76 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(5)(A) (2012). 
 77 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 985 (discussing how light duty 
positions reduce workers’ compensation costs); see, e.g., 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-33-
18.2 (2016) (describing suitable “alternative employment” provisions that can reduce 
or remove the requirement to pay workers’ compensation payments).  
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accommodate a disability.78 But, once an employer has provided an 
accommodation to at least some other employees, it is clear that the cost 
is not inherently prohibitive, and evidence that the employer routinely 
provides such benefits to many employees makes this all the more 
apparent. Thus, although providing the same support to pregnant 
employees will marginally increase the costs, that increase was 
anticipated by Congress when it enacted the PDA.79 
Indeed, as I discussed in detail in Gilbert Redux, at the time that the 
PDA was enacted, there were already several state laws that required 
employers to provide insurance benefits for short-term disabilities, but 
did not require comparable support for pregnancy.80 It was well 
understood (and has since been implemented for more than thirty 
years) that the PDA would require that pregnant employees receive 
comparable benefits under these laws.81 In other words, even though 
employers were providing short-term disability benefits to other 
employees in order to comply with state laws, the PDA was properly 
interpreted to require them to provide comparable benefits to 
employees who were pregnant or had just given birth. 
The interpretation of the PDA that the Court announced in Young 
was animated in part by its concern that an employer’s decision to 
provide accommodations for a limited number of employees under 
exceptional circumstances, such as those with “particularly hazardous 
jobs,” not confer on “pregnant workers an unconditional most-
favored-nation status.”82 Justice Alito paints the supposedly 
devastating effects of the “most-favored-nation” problem even more 
vividly. In his view, it would mean that if an employer “had a policy of 
refusing to provide any accommodation for any employee who was 
unable to work due to any reason but . . . the employer wished to 
make an exception for several employees who were seriously injured 
while performing acts of extraordinary heroism on the job, [such as] 
saving the lives of numerous fellow employees,” the employer would 
have to choose between “denying any special treatment for the heroic 
 
 78 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(o) (2016); see also, e.g., White v. York 
Int’l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 362 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that the ADA does not require 
accommodations that fundamentally alter the nature of the job).  
 79 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 996-97 (discussing Congress’s 
awareness that enactment of the PDA would increase employer costs).  
 80 See id. at 988, 997, 1027.  
 81 See id. at 997, 1019-20.  
 82 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1349-50 (2015).  
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employees or providing all the same benefit to all pregnant 
employees.”83 
The ADA Amendments Act makes the scenario that the majority 
opinion and Justice Alito imagine — in which pregnant employees are 
treated much better than employees with other kinds of health 
conditions — impossible. An employer could not have the policy that 
Justice Alito suggests (that it would “refuse to provide any 
accommodation for any employee who was unable to work for any 
reason”) because that policy would be in patent violation of the 
ADA.84 Rather, employers should now routinely accommodate even 
temporary health conditions (e.g., a back injury; a mobility 
impairment; diabetes; etc.) that cause limitations like those caused by 
pregnancy. 
The converse concern, however, remains pressing. The erroneous 
assumption made by some lower courts prior to Young, and Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Young, that ADA-accommodated employees 
could not be comparators under PDA analysis would mean that 
pregnant employees would be treated less well than employees with 
other health conditions that caused similar limitations. In other words, 
far from being treated as the “most favored nation,” pregnant 
employees would be treated as the “least favored nation.” To avoid 
this result, it is essential that courts implementing Young properly 
follow the analysis in the majority’s opinion, rather than Justice Alito’s 
contrary interpretation. Employees accommodated pursuant to the 
ADA, or a light duty policy for workplace injuries, may be 
comparators under the PDA. Moreover, showing that employers 
accommodate health conditions that cause limitations like those 
caused by pregnancy pursuant to such policies, while refusing to 
provide comparable accommodations to pregnant employees, is itself 
sufficient to raise a material issue of fact as to whether the refusal to 
accommodate pregnant employees is tainted by bias. 
For pregnant employees who work for large companies, it will likely 
be relatively straightforward to identify potential comparators. But 
pregnant women who work for small employers may not be able to 
identify comparators who have actually been accommodated pursuant 
to the ADA, or other applicable policies. In Gilbert Redux, I argued 
 
 83 Id. at 1358 n.3 (Alito, J., concurring).  
 84 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2012). The ADA and Title VII (including the PDA) 
have almost identical provisions defining private employers that are covered by the 
statute. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2012) (ADA), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012) 
(Title VII). Accordingly, in almost all cases, any private employer bound to comply 
with the PDA must also comply with the ADA.  
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that if it were apparent that employers would be required to 
accommodate comparable limitations under the ADA, or under other 
policies adopted by the employer, they should offer the same support 
to pregnant employees.85 Since UPS routinely accommodated 
numerous other employees, the Court in Young had no reason to 
address this question directly. However, the Court characterizes the 
statutory mandate as requiring “courts to consider the extent to which 
an employer’s policy treats pregnant workers less favorably than it 
treats non-pregnant workers similar in their ability and inability to 
work.”86 An employer’s policies — often explicitly, but certainly 
implicitly — require compliance with the ADA. Thus, this phrasing 
suggests that showing comparable limitations would be 
accommodated under the ADA should be sufficient to trigger scrutiny 
of an employer’s rationale for denying accommodations to a pregnant 
employee.87 
The federal Department of Labor’s recently-issued regulations on 
sex discrimination, which were revised to reflect the Court’s ruling in 
Young, make this point explicitly: The analysis turns on whether the 
employer would be required to accommodate comparable limitations 
under the ADA or other policies.88 The Guidelines include a new 
section that addresses accommodations for pregnancy and related 
medical conditions.89 They provide that Executive Order 11246 
(which prohibits sex discrimination by federal contractors and sub-
contractors) is violated if the employer denies accommodations to 
pregnant employees but: 
provides, or is required by its policy or by relevant laws to 
provide, such assignments, modifications, or other 
accommodations to other employees whose abilities or 
inabilities to perform their job duties are similarly affected, 
and the denial of accommodations imposes a significant 
 
 85 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 1033-35.  
 86 Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1344 (emphasis added). 
 87 See Joanna L. Grossman & Deborah L. Brake, Forceps Delivery: The Supreme 
Court Narrowly Saves the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in Young v. UPS, VERDICT (Mar. 
31, 2015), https://verdict.justia.com/2015/03/31/forceps-delivery (drawing the same 
conclusion from the Court’s language on this point); see also Grossman, supra note 10, 
at 856 (“Although the Court did not say so expressly, courts should base this 
comparison on the number of employees eligible for any accommodation under the 
policy rather than the number who have actually requested and been given an 
accommodation, which, in any given workplace, might be a null set.”). 
 88 See Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, 81 Fed. Reg. 39108, 39132-33 (June 15, 
2016).  
 89 See 41 C.F.R. § 60-20.5(c) (2016).  
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burden on employees affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions and the contractor’s asserted 
reasons for denying accommodations to such employees do 
not justify that burden.90 
The explanation of this section states that the highlighted language is 
“included to cover the situation where a contractor’s policy or a 
relevant law (such as the ADA and Section 503) would require an 
alternative job assignment or job modification . . . [for a non-pregnant 
employee] who is similarly restricted in his or her ability to perform 
the job, even if no such employees have been accommodated under 
the policy or law.”91 
The DOL’s regulations directly govern actions by federal contractors 
and subcontractors. The DOL’s interpretation should also be 
persuasive to courts considering PDA claims against companies that 
are not federal contractors. This is because the Department of Labor, 
an agency with considerable expertise in sex discrimination law, 
reached this interpretation after careful consideration of the Court’s 
decision in Young, and extensive comments provided by interested 
groups as part of its formal rulemaking process.92 
III. LOWER COURTS APPLYING YOUNG 
Young seems to have had an immediate — and dramatic — impact on 
how lower courts decide pregnancy accommodation claims. The 
National Women’s Law Center has analyzed recent published federal 
court decisions that consider whether a denial of accommodations 
violated the PDA.93 The Center’s findings are striking. Between 2012 
and the Court’s decision in Young in March 2015, over 70% of such 
cases (in which the court considered the merits of the claim) were 
dismissed prior to trial, on an employer’s motion to dismiss or a motion 
 
 90 Id. (emphasis added).  
 91 Discrimination on the Basis of Sex, 81 Fed. Reg. at 39133.  
 92 Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (“[T]he rulings, 
interpretations, and opinions [of the agency], while not controlling upon the courts 
by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed 
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort to guidance. The weight of 
such a judgment . . . will depend on the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all 
those factors which give it power to persuade . . . .”). 
 93 See Pregnancy Accommodation in the Courts One Year After Young v. UPS, NAT’L 
WOMEN’S L. CTR. (June 2016), https://nwlc.org/resources/pregnancy-accommodation-
in-the-courts-one-year-after-young-v-ups/.  
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for summary judgment.94 In the first year after Young, this trend was 
completely flipped, with 73% of claims allowed to proceed.95 Of course, 
as the National Women’s Law Center fact sheet emphasizes, the number 
of published cases on point is relatively low in any given year, so it is 
too soon to know whether this represents a true — and lasting — 
shift.96 Nonetheless, the numerical change, combined with substantive 
analysis of the cases decided, suggests that lower courts are heeding 
Young’s mandate to carefully scrutinize employers’ claimed justifications 
for differential treatment of accommodation requests.97 This section 
briefly analyzes the emerging case law, focusing on cases in which 
pregnant employees have suggested that individuals with light duty 
after on-the-job injuries or ADA-accommodated employees are 
appropriate comparators for PDA analysis. 
First, lower courts are properly accepting a broad range of 
comparators at the prima facie stage. This includes cases in which the 
pregnant employee identified other employees who were granted light 
duty after workplace injuries,98 or pursuant to the ADA,99 as well as 
 
 94 See id. (reporting 18 out of 25 cases decided on the merits between March 2012 
and March 2015 were dismissed prior to trial).  
 95 See id. (reporting 8 out of 11 cases decided on the merits between March 2015 
and March 2016 survived motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment).  
 96 That said, it is likely that these figures, which focus on reported cases, understate 
the effects of Young, in that it seems almost certain that Young increases the likelihood 
that employers would be willing to settle similar cases on relatively favorable terms to 
employees. More importantly, one would hope that more employers now routinely 
provide accommodations to pregnant employees, removing the need to file any kind of 
case at all. Indeed, many law firms emphasized to their clients that the Young decision 
means employers should carefully consider all pregnancy accommodation requests. See, 
e.g., Divided Supreme Court Revives Pregnancy Discrimination “Light Duty” Case, WINSTON 
& STRAWN LLP (Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/ 
divided-supreme-court-revives-pregnancy-discrimination-light.html (“[A]s a practical 
matter, employers should . . . consider pregnant workers’ accommodation requests, 
engaging employees in an interactive process if at all possible.”); Jeff Nowak, Supreme 
Court Gives Pregnant Employees a Path Toward Securing Workplace Accommodations, 
FMLA INSIGHTS (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.fmlainsights.com/supreme-court-gives-
pregnant-employees-a-path-toward-securing-workplace-accommodations/ (“Employers 
also must take seriously and review thoughtfully all employee requests for pregnancy-
related accommodations to minimize liability to pregnancy discrimination claims.”). 
 97 I am grateful to the National Women’s Law Center for sharing with me an 
unpublished memorandum analyzing this emerging case law. My analysis in this 
section draws on that memorandum.  
 98 See, e.g., Legg v. Ulster County, 820 F.3d 67, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that 
police officers provided light duty positions after workplace injuries were potential 
comparators); Bray v. Town of Wake Forest, No. 5:14–CV–276–FL, 2015 WL 
1534515, at *6 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 6, 2015) (same); see also McQuistion v. City of 
Clinton, 872 N.W.2d 817, 830 (Iowa 2015) (interpreting an Iowa statute that tracks 
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individuals accommodated for other injuries not covered by the ADA 
(in many instances, because they arose prior to the ADAAA’s effective 
date).100 Additionally, Young superseded prior precedent in the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits that had suggested that pregnant plaintiffs 
seeking an accommodation could not proceed under the traditional 
characterization of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case because 
they could not show that they were “qualified” for the position.101 
Young made clear that this approach was improper by articulating an 
alternative version of the prima facie case that does not include the 
“qualified” language at all. Rather, as discussed above, courts must 
simply consider whether the employer provided accommodations to 
non-pregnant employees “similar in their ability or inability to work” 
that it denied to pregnant employees.102 
Second, lower courts have held, properly I believe, that the modified 
McDonnell Douglas test set forth in Young, which calls for balancing 
the extent of the burden borne by pregnant employees against the 
strength of the employer’s rationale, is simply one way in which a 
plaintiff can establish the requisite discriminatory intent.103 She may 
also do so by identifying any other form of evidence that suggests the 
employer’s claimed rationale is not convincing. This could include 
derogatory comments about her pregnancy;104 shifting explanations 
 
the PDA to permit a pregnant employee to use “all those temporarily disabled, not just 
those injured off the job” as potential comparators).  
 99 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Marriott Int’l. Inc., 142 F. Supp. 3d 961, 978 (C.D. Cal. 
2015) (holding employees with “disabilities or medical conditions that require 
reasonable accommodations” could serve as comparators for lactating employee 
seeking comparable breaks during the day). 
 100 See, e.g., Martin v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 794, 820 (M.D. La. 
2015) (holding employees with back injury and a broken leg could serve as 
comparators for a pregnant employee with a similar lifting restriction).  
 101 See, e.g., Grace v. Adtran, Inc. 470 F. App’x 812, 814-15 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that pregnant employee with a lifting restriction could not satisfy the prima 
facie case because she could not meet the qualifications for her position); Spivey v. 
Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (similar); Elliott v. 
Horizon Healthcare Corp., No. 98-20711, 1999 WL 301346, at *3 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(similar).  
 102 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015). 
 103 See, e.g., Allen-Brown v. District of Columbia, 174 F. Supp. 3d 463, 476-78 
(D.D.C. 2016) (holding “it misreads Young to assert that a plaintiff is required to show 
such disparities in order to survive summary judgment,” and permitting plaintiff to 
rely on “traditional” evidence of pretext instead).  
 104 Sometimes, such comments are classified as “direct” evidence of discrimination. 
See, e.g., Martin, 132 F. Supp. 3d at 818 (holding comment that plaintiff “couldn’t do 
[her] [] job as Co-Director and be pregnant,” constituted direct evidence of 
discrimination). Even if classified as “direct” evidence, courts should also consider 
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for the decision;105 an expressed concern that she would not return to 
work after a maternity leave; or simply inconsistent application of a 
claimed policy — like limiting light duty positions to on-the-job 
injuries — that a defendant puts forward as an ostensibly legitimate 
non-discriminatory rationale.106 Moreover, it would be reasonable to 
consider any such evidence in conjunction with the relative burden 
that the denial of an accommodation places on pregnant employees, 
and the strength of the employer’s justification for such distinctions, 
when assessing whether the decision was motivated by bias. 
In terms of parsing the substantial burden test itself, lower courts, 
again appropriately I believe, have begun to develop a relatively 
flexible understanding of how this may be satisfied. Thus, for example, 
a corrections officer at a county jail who is told she can work but 
denied an accommodation that would protect her from violent 
altercations with inmates suffers the requisite burden.107 A police 
officer who was denied light duty but told she could simply forego the 
bullet proof vest typically worn — but not technically required — by 
officers on patrol likewise met the standard.108 As noted above, the 
Young Court specified that one way to show the requisite burden was 
evidence that an employer accommodates “a large percentage of 
 
whether such comments undercut any claimed non-discriminatory rationale in the 
context of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Cf. Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 
760, 765-66 (7th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e hold that district courts must stop separating 
‘direct’ from ‘indirect’ evidence and proceeding as if they were subject to different legal 
standards.”). However, if such “direct” evidence is sufficiently strong to convince a 
factfinder that the decision to deny an accommodation was motivated by an 
employee’s pregnancy, courts need not employ the (modified) McDonnell Douglas 
framework at all. See EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 915.003, supra note 7, at Part 
I.C. The ultimate question is simply whether the plaintiff can, using whatever 
combination of admissible evidence, convince a factfinder that the denial of 
accommodations was “because of” her pregnancy.  
 105 See, e.g., Legg v. Ulster County, 820 F.3d 67, 75 (2d Cir. 2016).  
 106 See, e.g., Allen-Brown, 174 F. Supp. 3d at 477 (denying summary judgment in 
case where evidence suggested employers did not consistently enforce their claimed 
policies related to light or modified duty).  
 107 Legg, 820 F.3d at 76-77.  
 108 See Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, No. 7:13-cv-02063-TMP, 2015 WL 6123209, at 
*21 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 19, 2015). The court discusses this issue in the context of 
determining that the plaintiff, who resigned after her request for light duty was 
denied, could satisfy the constructive discharge standard, but the analysis suggests 
that the court likewise assumes that it also satisfies Young’s substantial burden test. 
This case also concerns a breastfeeding employee, rather than a pregnant employee 
(the bullet-proof vest, if fitting properly, interfered with her ability to breastfeed), but 
the court treats this as a PDA claim, on the ground that lactating is a related medical 
condition. See also infra text accompanying note 126.  
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nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage 
of pregnant workers.”109 In applying this standard, the Second Circuit 
held that it could be satisfied by evidence showing that a single 
pregnant employee requested light duty and was denied it — meaning 
100% of pregnant employees were not accommodated — as contrasted 
with an employer policy providing light duty to all employees with on-
the-job injuries.110 This was adequate even though the record did not 
seem to include information on how many non-pregnant employees 
had actually been accommodated pursuant to the light duty policy. 
The same Second Circuit decision, Legg v. Ulster County, offers the 
most extensive analysis to date on the specific question of how courts 
applying Young should analyze an employer’s claim that its 
accommodation of other employees was pursuant to a statutory 
mandate.111 Legg was brought by a police officer whose request for 
light duty to accommodate her pregnancy was denied. In the 
litigation, the employer alleged that it only provided light duty for on-
the-job injuries, and this policy was justified by a New York state law 
that required cities to continue to pay corrections officers injured on 
the job.112 The state law did not have comparable requirements 
regarding on-going pay for off-duty injuries, or for pregnancy. In this 
respect, it is similar to more general workers’ compensation statutes, 
under which employers’ costs are typically minimized if employees 
who suffer workplace injuries are provided light duty positions.113 
Moreover, the analysis would be quite similar in a case in which the 
employer claimed it provided accommodations to non-pregnant 
employees with disabilities to comply with the ADA. 
The Second Circuit’s parsing and application of Young in this 
context is quite thoughtful. First, Legg emphasizes that even if, in the 
litigation, an employer identifies a statutory mandate as the basis for 
differential treatment, the veracity of this claim must be probed. At 
trial, Legg’s supervisor mentioned many shifting explanations for his 
refusal to transfer Legg to a light duty position, including concern for 
Legg’s safety and that of her “unborn child”; that it would be more 
costly to provide accommodations to pregnant employees; and that he 
 
 109 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015). 
 110 Legg, 820 F.3d at 76. The court also emphasized that this analysis must focus 
on how many pregnant employees were denied an accommodation in relation to all 
pregnant employees, not all employees. See id. 
 111 See id. at 75-77.  
 112 Id. at 74-75 (citing N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 207-c(1) (2016)).  
 113 See generally, Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2 (describing workers’ 
compensation statutes in more detail).  
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simply did not “believe” in offering light duty to employees with off-
the-job injuries.114 The relevant statute, by contrast, was barely 
mentioned. The court holds that this inconsistency, alone, would be 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant’s 
explanation — compliance with state law — was pretextual.115 
The court went on to hold that, even assuming that the statutory 
mandate were proven to be the basis of the employer’s decision to 
provide light-duty for on-the-job injuries, that would not end the 
inquiry. This is because the key question is not whether the 
accommodation in question was provided in compliance with a 
statutory mandate, but rather the converse: Did the statutory mandate 
preclude provision of the same accommodation to pregnant employees? 
The answer in Legg was no — “of course nothing in the statute 
prevented [the police department] from offering the same 
accommodations to pregnant employees”116 — and the answer will 
almost certainly be no in all other cases. An employer may opt to 
provide accommodations to pregnant employees if it chooses.117 
Flipping the question around in this manner is useful, because it 
helps crystalize what is relevant when assessing whether a refusal to 
provide an accommodation violates the PDA. Imagine, for example, a 
cashier in the third trimester of a pregnancy who asks permission to 
sit on a stool because standing has become very uncomfortable and 
she has been advised by her medical provider that sitting will reduce 
the risk of preterm birth.118 She points out that the employer has 
permitted a different employee, who has injured his back, to sit on the 
stool. The employer might claim that it only permitted the employee 
 
 114 Legg, 820 F.3d at 75.  
 115 Id.  
 116 Id. at 77.  
 117 It is conceivable that a non-pregnant employee with a health condition that 
caused limitations similar to those caused by pregnancy, but denied a comparable 
accommodation, would allege that a pregnancy “preference” is an impermissible form 
of sex discrimination. However, the Supreme Court has held that pregnancy may be 
treated more favorably than other health conditions. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n 
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285-92 (1987); see also Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 
998-1001 (discussing the special treatment/equal treatment debate in the context of 
the Cal Fed case); cf. Schultz, supra note 10, at 1087-88 (exploring the debate in the 
context of Young). As a practical matter, legal mandates, such as the ADA and the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, requiring support for health conditions generally 
mitigates this problem to a large degree.  
 118 See, e.g., M. Bonzini, Risk of Prematurity, Low Birth Weight, and Pre-Eclampsia in 
Relation to Working Hours and Physical Activities: A Systemic Review, 64 OCCUPATIONAL 
& ENVTL. MED. 228 (2007) (concluding that while evidence is mixed, it may be 
prudent to avoid prolonged standing, especially late in pregnancy).  
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with the back injury to sit on the stool because the ADA requires this 
as a reasonable accommodation. That assertion might be true. 
However, the question ultimately is why, having already made this 
accommodation, is the employer unwilling to make the same 
accommodation for a pregnant employee?119 Certainly, the ADA does 
not preclude permitting the pregnant employee to sit on the stool. In 
this case, the burden on the pregnant employee is considerable and 
the justification for the employer’s denial quite weak, in that the 
requested accommodation is virtually cost free. Thus, it would be 
reasonable to infer that a refusal to make such a minor 
accommodation reflects discriminatory bias, such as discomfort with 
having pregnant women in the workplace or skepticism that a 
pregnant employee would return to work after a maternity leave. 
The analysis does not change simply because the accommodation in 
question may be more costly. In Legg, for example, the court 
recognized that, because New York state law requires that officers with 
on-the-job injuries continue to receive full pay, the department had a 
strong incentive to keep them working in some capacity, and that it 
didn’t have the same financial incentive to keep Legg working.120 
Rather, permitting Legg to move to a light duty position might require 
the employer to find someone else to do the regular position, and pay 
that person as well.121 The employer tried to argue that this made the 
distinction that it drew permissible — asserting that “‘[i]f there is an 
element of cost associated with the distinction, it is a result of New 
York State law and policy.’”122 The Legg court properly rejected this 
contention, referencing the Supreme Court’s clear holding in Young 
that increased costs generally are not a legitimate basis for refusing to 
provide accommodations under the PDA.123 Thus, it concluded, “to 
the extent the defendant’s policy was motivated by cost, a reasonable 
jury could conclude that their purported justification for denying light 
duty accommodations to pregnant employees — compliance with state 
law — is pretextual.”124 
 
 119 Of course, one might reasonably wonder why an employer would refuse to 
provide such a low-cost accommodation for a pregnant employee even in the absence 
of a comparator. However, the PDA analysis turns on showing that an employer has 
accommodated, or would be required to accommodate, other employees with 
comparable limitations in the ability or inability to work.  
 120 Legg, 820 F.3d at 77.  
 121 Id.  
 122 Id.  
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. The Legg court suggests that if the evidence showed that the County 
accommodated very few injured workers under the light duty policy, and that many 
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In most instances, since compliance with other laws will not 
preclude providing accommodations to pregnant employees, resistance 
to providing comparable accommodations will stem from a concern 
about increased costs, or simply bias against pregnant employees, not a 
concern about compliance with the (other) law at issue. And thus, in 
most instances, this claimed defense should be rejected. The PDA is 
structured so that, once having borne costs to comply with one 
statutory mandate, an employer cannot refuse to provide comparable 
support to pregnant employees simply on the grounds that doing so 
would increase its costs. Indeed, I argued in Gilbert Redux that this 
was a key strength of the PDA’s comparative mandate. It sidesteps 
debates over whether pregnancy should receive “special” treatment — 
which might spur increased discrimination against pregnant women or 
women in general — by focusing instead on ensuring that employers 
have truly legitimate justifications for refusing to provide pregnant 
women the same level of support that they are providing other 
employees with health conditions that affect work. This requires a 
careful, case-by-case analysis, and summary judgment on this ground 
would generally be inappropriate. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that plaintiffs are succeeding in 
using the PDA, as interpreted in Young, to support claims that 
employers should accommodate lactation or breastfeeding. Although 
some older case law holds differently, there is a growing recognition in 
the courts that discrimination related to breastfeeding or lactation 
violates the PDA, in that breastfeeding and lactation fall within the 
“related medical conditions” portion of the PDA’s language.125 
Building on this recognition, plaintiffs are successfully arguing that 
accordingly, if an employer routinely accommodates other needs for 
break time, it must similarly accommodate employees who are 
breastfeeding or expressing breastmilk.126 The EEOC has reached the 
same conclusion in its recent guidance.127 
 
non-pregnant workers were denied accommodations, a jury might properly refuse to 
infer a discriminatory intent. A jury trial was held after the case was remanded by the 
Second Circuit, and Legg did not prevail in her intentional discrimination claim. Ariel 
Zangla, Jury Rules for Ulster County in Jail Officer’s Discrimination Case, DAILY FREEMAN 
NEWS (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.dailyfreeman.com/general-news/20160831/jury-
rules-for-ulster-county-in-jail-officers-discrimination-case.  
 125 The leading case is Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Houston 
Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding “lactation is a related 
medical condition of pregnancy for purposes of the PDA”).  
 126 See, e.g., Allen-Brown v. District of Columbia, 174 F. Supp. 3d 463, 478-79 
(D.D.C. 2016) (permitting claim related to failure to accommodate lactation to survive 
summary judgment where employee could point to comparators who had received 
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The PDA claim is, of course, comparative in nature; an employee 
must show that her request for support for breastfeeding or lactation 
was treated differently from other requests from employees with 
similar ability or inability to work, or that there is other evidence that 
the denial was motivated by bias. The Fair Labor Standards Act, by 
contrast, provides non-exempt employees (i.e., employees who are 
eligible for overtime) with an affirmative right for reasonable unpaid 
breaks and an appropriate room for expressing breastmilk.128 While 
the rights under FLSA are thus, in some ways, more robust, Title VII 
claims may be an important complement to the FLSA provisions 
because there is uncertainty as to the extent to which FLSA provides a 
remedy to employees who do not receive the time off they should.129 
Additionally, PDA claims may be brought by any employee (who 
works for an employer with at least fifteen employees), whereas these 
FLSA claims are only available to non-exempt employees. 
IV. OTHER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS ALSO SUPPORTING 
PREGNANCY ACCOMMODATIONS 
My focus in this essay, like my focus in Gilbert Redux, is how the 
PDA applies to claims brought by pregnant women challenging a 
denial of accommodations. But, since my article was published, there 
have been other developments that are also relevant to whether 
pregnant employees should be accommodated. 
First, lower courts have now had several years to analyze pregnancy-
related claims under the amended ADA. As noted above, the Young 
Court stated that the changes made to the ADA could “limit the future 
significance of [its] interpretation of the [PDA],”130 and the EEOC’s 
 
accommodations); Hicks v. City of Tuscaloosa, No. 7:13-cv-02063-TMP, 2015 WL 
6123209, at *21 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 19, 2015) (same); Gonzales v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 142 
F. Supp. 3d 961, 978 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (same with respect to a motion to dismiss).  
 127 EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 915.003, supra note 7, at Part I.A.4.b.  
 128 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (2012). 
 129 The DOL may bring an action for injunctive relief. See WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, BREAK TIME FOR NURSING MOTHERS UNDER THE FLSA, 
http://www.dol.gov/whd/nursingmothers/#AdditionalResources. If a plaintiff seeks to 
bring a private cause of action, however, she may run into a problem because the 
typical remedy for violations of this portion of FLSA is recovery of lost wages; since 
the break time for this purpose may be unpaid, there generally are not any lost wages 
(even if the employer has not complied with the statutory mandate at all). See Lico v. 
TD Bank, No. 14-CV-4729 (JFB)(AKT), 2015 WL 3467159 at *2-4 (E.D.N.Y. June 1, 
2015) (explaining the issue but emphasizing that a private right of action may be 
available if there are lost wages). 
 130 Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1348 (2015).  
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regulations state that pregnancy-related impairments may qualify as 
disabilities.131 The EEOC’s guidance on pregnancy discrimination 
provides several examples: pregnancy-related sciatica (often the cause 
of back pain in pregnancy), pregnancy-related carpel tunnel 
syndrome, gestational diabetes, swelling in the legs, and depression.132 
Lower courts have begun to recognize explicitly that older decisions, 
which applied the pre-ADAAA disability standard and concluded that 
pregnancy-related claims were almost never viable, must be 
reconsidered.133 Many courts have held that employees seeking 
accommodations for pregnancy-related complications under the ADA 
may succeed.134 
Second, there has been an explosive growth in state laws that 
affirmatively require accommodations for pregnant employees, even in 
the absence of a comparator or any showing of bias. When I wrote 
Gilbert Redux, there were only a few such laws and they were 
relatively narrow in scope.135 However, in the past four years, many 
more states passed laws on point. As of June 2016, eighteen states, the 
District of Columbia, and four cities, explicitly require at least some 
 
 131 See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (2016). 
 132 EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at Part II.A.  
 133 See, e.g., Bray v. Town of Wake Forest, No. 5:14-CV-276-FL, 2015 WL 
1534515, at *11 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 6, 2015) (holding pre-ADAAA circuit and lower court 
case law regarding pregnancy-caused lifting restrictions were inapposite); see also 
Deborah A. Widiss, Still Kickin’ After All These Years: Sutton and Toyota as Shadow 
Precedents, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 919, 939-45 (2015) (identifying and critiquing lower 
court decisions that inappropriately continue to rely on pre-ADAAA standards more 
generally); Williams et al., supra note 59, at 112-35 (discussing the application of the 
amended ADA to pregnancy-related claims in detail).  
 134 See, e.g., Bray, 2015 WL 1534515, at *11 (holding ADA claim viable where 
pregnant employee was told to avoid lifting more than 20 pounds, running, or 
jumping); McKellips v. Franciscan Health Sys., No. C13-5096MJP, 2013 WL 1991103, 
at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2013) (holding severe pelvic pain caused by pregnancy 
could qualify as a disability); Nayak v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., No. 
1:12-cv-0817-RLY-MJD, 2013 WL 121838, at *1-3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 2013) (holding 
ADA claim viable where pregnancy required bed rest and post-partum complications 
required physical therapy); Alexander v. Trilogy Health Servs., No. 1:11-cv-295, 2012 
WL 5268701, at *11-12 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2012) (granting summary judgment in 
favor of plaintiff where employer failed to accommodate pregnancy-related 
hypertension); see also Khan v. Midwestern Univ., 147 F. Supp. 3d 718, 722-23 (N.D. 
Ill. 2015) (holding Rehabilitation Act claim, incorporating the ADA standard, viable 
where pregnancy caused severe nausea, depression and anxiety). But see Simon, supra 
note 10, at 274-75 (suggesting that courts might continue to be reluctant to classify 
pregnancy-related conditions as ADA-qualifying disabilities).  
 135 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 1011 (discussing then-existing state 
laws).  
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employers to provide accommodations to pregnant workers.136 
Moreover, most of the new laws are far broader than the first 
generation of accommodation statutes, in that they require employers 
to provide reasonable accommodations for all pregnant employees, 
regardless of job category, unless doing so would impose an undue 
hardship on the employer.137 Thus, in more than one third of the 
states, pregnant employees can use state laws to secure 
accommodations that let them work safely through a pregnancy. 
Third, plaintiffs may be able to show that facially neutral policies 
that limit the availability of accommodations are unlawful because 
they cause a disparate impact on women.138 In general, courts have 
been relatively hostile to disparate impact claims in the pregnancy 
context.139 However, very few pre-Young cases considered how the 
doctrine would apply to light duty policies limited to on-the-job 
injuries,140 and plaintiffs had succeeded in a few such cases.141 At oral 
argument in Young, Justice Breyer suggested it would have been 
preferable for Ms. Young to have challenged the policy under a 
disparate impact framework.142 Justice Scalia’s dissent makes this point 
 
 136 See NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR 
PREGNANT WORKERS: STATE AND LOCAL LAWS (2016), http://www.nationalpartnership. 
org/research-library/workplace-fairness/pregnancy-discrimination/reasonable-
accommodations-for-pregnant-workers-state-laws.pdf. 
 137 See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101, 102 (2017); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292, 296 
(2016); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953 § 34A-5-106(g) (2016).  
 138 See generally Camille Hebert, Disparate Impact and Pregnancy: Title VII’s Other 
Accommodation Requirement, 24 J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 107 (2016) (arguing that 
disparate impact provides stronger grounds than disparate treatment for 
accommodating pregnancy).  
 139 See Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal 
Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 415, 485-90 (2011) (discussing 
and critiquing recent pregnancy discrimination cases that reject disparate impact 
claims).  
 140 See, e.g., Joanna Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: 
Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 15, 41-46 (2009) (reviewing existing case law and arguing that disparate 
impact has “untapped potential” for challenging facially neutral policies that limit the 
availability of accommodations). 
 141 See Germain v. County of Suffolk, No. 07-CV-2523 (ADS)(ARL), 2009 WL 
1514513, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2009) (holding plaintiff established a prima facie 
case that the employer’s light-duty policy has a disparate impact on pregnant women); 
Lochren v. County of Suffolk, No. 01CV03925, 2006 WL 6850118 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 
2006) (verdict sheet). In both cases, however, there was also evidence of 
discriminatory intent, sufficient to support a disparate treatment claim.  
 142 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8-9, Young v. United Postal Serv., Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 1338 (2015) (No. 12–1226) (“[I]t did seem to me there is a . . . quite easy way for 
you to win, and that would be to bring a disparate impact claim.”). 
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more emphatically, arguing that she should not have been able to 
succeed under a disparate treatment framework at all, but that her 
claim might have been viable as a disparate impact claim.143 The 
EEOC’s recent pregnancy guidance and the DOL’s new sex 
discrimination regulations likewise recognize that disparate impact 
claims may be cognizable in this context.144 The support from multiple 
Supreme Court justices for this approach, combined with the new 
guidance issued by the relevant agencies charged with enforcing this 
law, suggests that disparate impact claims might be an additional 
viable strategy for securing employer support for pregnancy. 
CONCLUSION 
In Young v. UPS, the Court emphasized that refusals to 
accommodate pregnant employees should be carefully scrutinized. 
This is particularly true now that the amended ADA requires 
employers to provide support for a wide range of other temporary 
health conditions that can cause limitations like those caused by 
pregnancy. As discussed above, lower courts are routinely holding that 
summary judgment in such cases is inappropriate, and they are 
permitting claims under both the PDA and the ADA to move forward 
to trial. But the standard that the Court adopts in Young is somewhat 
difficult to parse, and the right to accommodations under the PDA 
remains comparative, not absolute. Thus, the absence of a clear 
statutory mandate on point means that both employers and employees 
may be confused about the extent of an employer’s obligations under 
federal law. 
In Gilbert Redux, I mentioned briefly that the Pregnant Workers 
Fairness Act (“PWFA”) had been introduced in Congress. This bill 
would explicitly require employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations for pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical 
conditions, unless they could show that doing so would be an undue 
hardship.145 In 2013, when I completed that earlier article, I was rather 
doubtful that PWFA would advance.146 My pessimism may have been 
unfounded. I have been (pleasantly) surprised by the widespread 
 
 143 See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1365-66 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 144 41 C.F.R. 60-20.5(c)(2) (2016) (specifying that denial of light duty or other 
accommodations pursuant to facially neutral policy may give rise to disparate impact 
liability); EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 7, at I.C.1.b (same).  
 145 See Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R. 2654, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015); 
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 1512, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015). A new version of 
this bill will likely be introduced in the Congress that convened in January 2017.  
 146 See Widiss, Gilbert Redux, supra note 2, at 1035.  
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support for comparable state laws. Many have been enacted by 
bipartisan, often unanimous, majorities, and they have passed in “red” 
states such as North Dakota and Utah, as well as “blue” states such as 
New York and California.147 Polls find that 95% of Americans believe 
that it is reasonable for employers to provide minor accommodations 
to pregnant workers.148 Congress should follow the lead of the states 
and pass the PWFA. In other words, I hope that the analysis above — 
about how the PDA interacts with the ADA — will soon become 
obsolete, superseded by a clear directive that employers provide 
reasonable support to their employees to make it possible to work 
safely and productively through a pregnancy. 
 
 147 See Statement of Debra Ness, President, Nat’l P’ship for Women & Families (June 
4, 2015), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/news-room/press-releases/reintroduction-
of-bipartisan-pregnant-workers-fairness-act-is-essential-step-in-protecting-pregnant-
workers-from-discrimination.html; see also NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra 
note 136.  
 148 CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, SURVEY ON PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION (Nov. 2014), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/YoungPollingMemo.pdf.  
